Questions about the nature of the relationship between language and extralinguistic cognition are old, but only recently has a new view emerged that allows for the systematic investigation of claims about linguistic structure, based on how it is understood or utilized outside of the language system. Our paper represents a case study for this interaction in the domain of event semantics. We adopt a transparency thesis about the relationship between linguistic structure and extralinguistic cognition, investigating whether different lexico-syntactic structures can (...) differentially recruit the visual causal percept. A prominent analysis of causative verbs like move suggests reference to two distinct events and a causal relationship between them, whereas non-causative verbs like push do not so refer. In our study, we present English speakers with simple scenes that either do or do not support the perception of a causal link, and manipulate (between subjects) a one-sentence instruction for the evaluation of the scene. Preliminary results suggest that competent speakers of English are more likely to judge causative constructions than non-causative constructions as true of a scene where causal features are present in the scene. Implications for a new approach to the investigation of linguistic meanings and future directions are discussed. (shrink)

Est-il vrai que la notion chrétienne de création soit une notion complètement nouvelle par rapport à la philosophie grecque ? Telle est la question qu'on se pose dans l'article ci-dessus. Si d'habitude on est incliné à répondre à cette question par l'affirmative, c'est en admettant que, assez généralement, la philosophie grecque connaît l'idée d'une matière préexistante. C'est ainsi que les apologètes grecs du deuxième siècle, tels qu'Aristide et Théophile d'Antioche, se sont opposés à la philosophie grecque et spécialement à la (...) doctrine de Platon telle qu'ils l'ont comprise. L'auteur essaie de démontrer que, en fait, Platon n'a pas admis une matière préexistante dans le sens voulu par ses adversaires. Il n'a ni enseigné que les éléments préexistassent à l'œuvre créatrice du Démiurge , ni introduit sa notion d' espace dans le sens de matière, telle qu'Aristote, suivant sa propre terminologie, a voulu l'expliquer. C'est donc une erreur de dire que Platon ait admis une matière qui soit « coéternelle » et « du même âge », donc du même ordre que Dieu. Pour Platon, et pour Aristote également, le principe non déterminé ne saurait, comme tel, être du même orde que le premier Principe de l'être qui est comme tel un principe déterminant et déterminé. C'e'st une erreur, encore, de dire que, sur ce point comme sur beaucoup d'autres, Aristote était plus près de la vérité, donc du Christianisme, que Platon, le « Démiurge » du dernier n'étant pas une cause totale, tandis que le Premier Moteur d'Aristote était, dans un sens, vraiment une cause totale. Ce qui se voit clairement chez Platon, non seulement dans le Timée, mais aussi dans la République et dans le Philète , c'est qu'il est constamment et profondément préoccupé de fonder l'existence relative dans l'Existence absolue. Il a reconnu le rapport entre le monde visible et le Monde transcendant comme une relation de dépendance totale et essentielle. Or, si, dans son essence, la notion chrétienne de création n'est autre chose qu'une telle relation de dépendance, Platon, qui a fait de cette notion la base de toute sa philosophie, était par là-même près de la foi chrétienne. Aristote, d'autre part, bien qu'il ait dit une fois au moins que de son premier Principe tout l'univers dépend, a minimisé en fait le rapport entre le premier Principe et notre monde. Dans la notion chrétienne de création deux éléments se dissinguent : L'Etre Absolu, dont sort tout ce qui est relatif, se distingue dans son essence de tout ce qui n'est pas Lui. Le mode selon lequel l'être relatif sort de l'Absolu n'est pas celui d'une nécessité de nature, mais d'un acte de volonté. En partant de cette analyse, on peut déterminer exactement les degrés de différence ou d'affinité entre la notion chrétienne de création et les différents systèmes de philosophie grecque. En rapport avec la Stoa, la différence est dans la notion de Dieu : ne reconnaissant pas sa transcendance, on méconnaît l'opposition entre l'Absolu et l'être relatif. Quant à Aristote, il n'explique aucunement comment l'être relatif provient de l'Absolu : son premier Moteur n'est pas la cause de l'être, et les « formes » immanentes des objets naturels restent chez lui sans aucune explication. Sans doute, Platon explique davantage. Il est suivi par les Néoplatoniciens qui font provenir l'être relatif de l'Absolu, tout en connaissant une différence essentielle entre l'un et l'autre, mais n'admettant point d'acte de volonté de la part de l'Absolu. Platon qui, probablement, admettait un acte de volonté, se trouvait par là-même le plus près de la notion chrétienne de création. Il en différait, cependant, sur quelques points importants. Il n'enseigne qu'en partie une création directe : c'est que le Nous transcendant qui est le Démiurge, constitue des éléments le monde visible ; ces éléments, il ne les a pas trouvés comme tels, mais il les a faits de — « quelque chose » qu'on n'a pas le droit de nommre une chose. Il « fait » donc le monde dans son aspect intelligible. Mais il reste un aspect qui échappe à la pensée et qui, comme tel, ne saurait provenir du Principe Suprême qui domine la hiérarchie platonicienne de l'être. Ensuite, le Nous transcendant fait les âmes : l'âme du monde, les astres , les âmes humaines. Il ne fait ni les corps humains ni les êtres vivants d'un ordre inférieur à l'homme. Ceux-là, ils sont tous créés par les « dieux créés » et secondaires qui sont les Astres. Pour Platon, l'Esprit transcendant qui crée le monde n'est pas le Principe suprême. Il se trouve d'après ce qu'il paraît, à un degré plus bas dans la hiérarchie de l'être. Ce seront les penseurs chrétiens, ce sera tout d'abord Saint Athanase qui, en unifiant essentiellement le Père et son Logos, a réuni l'Un et le Nous transcendant qui est le Démiurge de Platon. Au lieu d'opposer au Platonisme la doctrine qu'il n'y a pas de matière préexistante, Dieu ayant « concréé » la matière, nous préférons de dire : Platon a éloigné la notion d'infini et d'indétermination de son principe suprême ; donc, il en a fait un autre principe, jamais du même ordre que l'Un, mais tout de même un principe fondamental. La notion chrétienne de Dieu, d'autre part, renferme et le caractère de l'Un et celui de l'Infini. (shrink)

The author sets forth that, especially in later Platonism, some aspects should be noted different from those which are usually considered as being characteristic of Plato's philosophy : in later Platonism the stress is laid on the fact that the visible world is an image of the invisible as perfect as it could possibly be ; soul is superior to body, but not separated from it ; and in the visible world an element of identity is fundamentally admitted. In Parm. (...) and Soph, motion is introduced into the intelligible world. The main theses of Platonism as a whole are : the existence of a transcendent intelligible world, the existence of an analogy between this intelligible world and ours. It neither can be said that modern philosophy as a whole rejects these theses, nor that Antiquity as a whole accepted them. Aristotle and the schools after him rejected the (first thesis, sceptics denied the second ; Neoplatonism restored them both. During the Middle Ages they were generally accepted ; only Occam denied the principle of analogy. So did Kant, and neopositivism seems to have accepted this heritage, when it holds that metaphysics have no sense. On the other hand, the « existentialism » of the school of Sartre denies that an eternal essence of things would precede their concrete existence ; and by this doctrine the first point of Platonism is denied as well. Against these modern philosophers others do accept the first principles of Platonism, and Plato's own attitude towards the materialistic philosophy of nature of his time authorizes the opinion that, on the point in question, Plato would not change his position if he lived in our days. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of different coping styles on situational coping in everyday life situations and gender differences. An ecological momentary assessment study with the mobile health app TrackYourStress was conducted with 113 participants. The coping styles Positive Thinking, Active Stress Coping, Social Support, Support in Faith, and Alcohol and Cigarette Consumption of the Stress and Coping Inventory were measured at baseline. Situational coping was assessed by the question “How well can you cope with (...) your momentary stress level” over 4 weeks. Multilevel models were conducted to test the effects of the coping styles on situational coping. Additionally, gender differences were evaluated. Positive Thinking and Active Stress Coping had significant positive impacts on situational coping in the total sample. For women, Social Support had a significant positive effect on situational coping. For men, Active Stress Coping had a significant positive effect on situational coping. Women had higher scores on the SCI scale Social Support than men. These results suggest that different coping styles could be more effective in daily life for women than for men. Taking this into account, interventions tailored to users’ coping styles might lead to better coping outcomes than generalized interventions. (shrink)

The Rediscovery of the mind By John Searle MIT Press, 1992. Pp. xv + 270. ISBN 0–262–19321–3 £19.95 hbk.The Ethics of Authenticity By Charles Taylor Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. 152. ISBN 0–674–26863–6. $17.95Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’ By Charles Taylor Princeton University Press, 1992. p. 112. ISBN 0–691–0878–65. $14.95New books on feminismAbjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva By John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin Routledge, 1990. Pp. 224. ISBN 0–415–04155–4. £35 hbk.Feminist Literary Studies: An Introduction By (...) K. K. Ruthven Canto, 1991 (first published 1984). Pp. 152 ISBN 0–521–398525. £4.95 pbk.Socialism, Feminism and Philosophy: A Radical Philosophy Reader Edited by Sean Sayers and Peter Sayers Routledge, 1990. Pp. 256. ISBN 0–415–05627–6. £35 hbk.Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine By Margaret Whitford Routledge, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0–415–05968–2. £35 hbk.New books on wittgensteinWittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Text and Context Edited by Robert C. Arrington and Hans‐Johann Glock Routledge, 1992. Pp. 256. ISBN 0415–07035‐X. £35.00 hbk.Wittgenstein on Words as Instruments. Lessons in Philosophical Psychology By J. M. F. Hunter Savage, Barnes and Noble Books, 1990. Pp. 192. ISBN 0–389–20920–1. $42.00Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief By Cyrill Barrett Blackwell, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0–631–16815‐X. £45.00. (shrink)

Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions (...) in the areas of history, law, mathematics, and psychology. (shrink)

Many philosophers have appealed to the PSR in arguments for a being that exists a se, a being whose explanation is in itself. But what does it mean, exactly, for something to have its explanation ‘in itself’? Contemporary philosophers have said next to nothing about this, relying instead on phrases plucked from the accounts of various historical figures. In this article, I analyse five such accounts – those of Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz – and argue that none are (...) satisfactory. Should we abandon or restrict the PSR, then? I think that would be hasty, for many reasons. I therefore consider the prospects of explaining everything, including God, given the constraints of certain features of good explanations, and conclude with several observations about future approaches. (shrink)

Political violence in the form of wars, insurgencies, terrorism and violent rebellion constitutes a major human challenge. C. A. J. Coady brings a philosophical and ethical perspective as he places the problems of war and political violence in the frame of reflective ethics. In this book, Coady re-examines a range of urgent problems pertinent to political violence against the background of a contemporary approach to just war thinking. The problems examined include: the right to make war and conduct war, terrorism, (...) revolution, humanitarianism, mercenary warriors, the ideal of peace and the right way to end war. Coady attempts to vindicate the contemporary relevance of the just war tradition to current problems without applying the tradition in a merely mechanical or uncritical fashion. (shrink)

Coady explores the challenges that morality poses to politics. He confronts the complex intellectual tradition known as realism, which seems to deny any relevance of morality to politics, especially international politics. He argues that, although realism has many serious faults, it has lessons to teach us: in particular, it cautions us against the dangers of moralism in thinking about politics and particularly foreign affairs. Morality must not be confused with moralism: Coady characterizes various forms of moralism and sketches their distorting (...) influence on a realistic political morality. He seeks to restore the concept of ideals to an important place in philosophical discussion, and to give it a particular pertinence in the discussion of politics. He deals with the fashionable idea of "dirty hands," according to which good politics will necessarily involve some degree of moral taint or corruption. Finally, he examines the controversial issue of the role of lying and deception in politics. Along the way Coady offers illuminating discussion of historical and current political controversies. This lucid book will provoke and stimulate anyone interested in the interface of morality and politics. (shrink)

In the past thirty years, two fundamental issues have emerged in the philosophy of science. One concerns the appropriate attitude we should take towards scientific theories--whether we should regard them as true or merely empirically adequate, for example. The other concerns the nature of scientific theories and models and how these might best be represented. In this ambitious book, da Costa and French bring these two issues together by arguing that theories and models should be regarded as partially rather than (...) wholly true. They adopt a framework that sheds new light on issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate. The new machinery of "partial structures" that they develop offers a new perspective from which to view the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development. Their conclusions will be of wide interest to philosophers and historians of science. (shrink)

C. A. J. Coady offers to clear up confusion about what terrorism is. His "tactical definition" focuses on terrorist acts as violent attacks upon non-combatants. He discusses what it means to be a non-combatant, considers various philosophical attempts to defend terrorism, and examines the idea of a connection between religion and terrorism.

The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited in scope – roughly, to intertheoretic reduction among empirical theories – (...) and informal in presentation – not least because a satisfying formal account of theories has yet to be offered. And despite the length, the treatment is still condensed; often corroborating and/or intuitively helpful detail has had to be consigned to footnotes or omitted. I approach the problem from within my own naturalistic realist philosophy of science and formal analysis of abstract hierarchy in theory. The sources for the former are [25], [29], [31], and [32] and those for the latter essentially [27] and [30]. Hierarchical notions played a significant role in the already published [34]. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.